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In the early 21st century, violent extremism in general and Islamist violence in particular
have been dominated by several jihadist movements that are regionally-based, primarily
operate at regional level and have been undergoing the bottom-up regionalization
process. All these movements are major combatants in the world!s most intense regional
armed conflicts and the lead terrorist actors against non-combatants. All try to build
Islamic states in their regions. They are distinct from both peripheral Islamist/separatist
insurgencies fought at subnational level and from al-Qaeda as an inherently extra-
territorial movement and ideology, with a fully globalized agenda. Against this back-
ground, Daesh, or the “Islamic State”, did not emerge as a global phenomenon, but as a
regionalmovement in the Iraq-Syria context, driven by bottom-up regional dynamics and
conflicts facilitated by collapse or weakness of states of the region, fueled by sectarianism
and catalyzed by external interventions. The key question is: what turned this regional
actor into the new cutting edge of “global jihad” as amovement and ideology?The article
identifies threemain trends in the evolution of transnational violent Islamism: bottom-up
“regionalization”, network fragmentation of the “global jihad” movement and the in-
tensification of targeted intra- and cross-regional jihadist “migration flows”.While inter-
related, these trends are distinct, develop in parallel to one another, and only partially
overlap. It is precisely where they overlap that the Daesh phenomenon has formed.
Ekaterina Stepanova heads Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at the Institute of theWorld
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Professor and lectures at the EuropeanUniversity in Saint-Petersburg. She authored 170
publications in ten languages and several books, including Terrorism in Asymmetrical
Conflict : Ideological and Structural Aspects (Oxford University Press, 2008). In 2007–
2009, she directed Armed Conflicts and Conflict Management Program at Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute.
Introduction
In the early 21st century, themain challenge of violent Islamist extremismhas been
posed by neither Islamist/ethnoseparatist groups in peripheral low-intensity
conflicts mainly fought at subnational level, nor by the fully globalized, extra-
territorial fragmented network known as “al-Qaeda”. Violent extremism in the
21st century has been dominated by radical Islamist (jihadist) movements that are
regionally-based and primarily operate at regional level. In this context, a “region”
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refers to a supra-national and transnational political and geographical space (e.g.,
the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Middle East1
etc.). For armed Islamist-jihadist actors active in these regional spaces, the degree
of regionalization may fall anywhere between the systematic cross-border spill-
over (e.g., for Nigeria-based “Boko Haram”) to acquiring a more thorough re-
gional scale (as in case of the inherently cross-border “Islamic State”, orDaesh, in
the Iraq-Syria context and across the Middle East). This article!s central focus on
regionally-based Islamist-jihadist groups is merited by two facts.
First, more generally, they dominate among all other non-state militant-ter-
rorist actors around the world, religious or secular alike, in terms of intensity of
violence. Out of the topmost activemilitant/insurgent-terrorist groups of the past
decade, the majority – from seven to eight groups, depending on the particular
year – were radical Islamist (Islamist-jihadist) movements. These included the
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/“ash-Sham” (ISIL/ISIS, or Daesh by its abbre-
viation in Arabic), the Taliban in Afghanistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan,
“Boko Haram” in Nigeria, Somalia-based “ash-Shabaab”, closely followed by
Syria-based “Jabhat an-Nusrah”, “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, and
“Lashkar-e-Jangvi” in Pakistan. These jihadist groups, especially the top five,
remain the most lethal and it is this type of group that has driven global increases
in intensity of armed violence by non-state actors. According toGlobal Terrorism
Index, much of the terrorist activity in the world in 2014 has been concentrated in
just five countries – all the main areas of origin and operation of cross-border,
regionally-based violent Islamist groups from the list above: 78 % of all deaths
and 57 % of all terrorist attacks occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan
andSyria.2 In 2014,Daesh andBokoHaramalonewere responsible for 51 %of all
claimed global terrorism fatalities.3
Second, more specifically, it is armed groups of the regional scale and mainly
active at the regional level that dominate both in the above-given list and among
all perpetrators of Islamist violence. On this count, a handful of major regionally-
based jihadist movements leave far behind much more numerous and more
widespread localized Islamist-separatists groups, on the one hand, and the waning
al-Qaeda as an inherently extraterritorial movement and ideology, with a fully
globalized agenda and no single core regional/territorial base, on the other hand.
A November 2014 “snapshot” of the state of jihadist violence around the world
that month showed that 80 % of all fatalities of such violence were concentrated
in just four countries – Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Syria, with Iraq alone
accounting for over a third of the total and Nigeria, Afghanistan and Syria each
1 In this usage, theMiddle East includes theArabian peninsula, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq,
Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, Syria, and Turkey.
2 See Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of
Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), p. 2.
3 See ibid. p. 14.
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responsible for 13–15 %.4 In all these areas, the lead perpetrators of such violence
are both (a) explicitly jihadist and (b) regionally-based, regionally-active and
primarily regionally-focused movements.
All thesemovements are themain andmajor combatants in respective regional
armed conflicts. All, in addition to combat, employ terrorism against civilians and
non-combatants –more actively thanmost othermilitant groups across the world.
All call for and try to build Islamic states in their respective regions. All sys-
tematically engage in cross-border violence and display various degree of re-
gionalization of armed/terrorist activity.
The following sections explore the dominant “bottom-up” type of region-
alization of violent radical Islamism in the early 21st century, analyze the Daesh
phenomenon in the Iraq-Syria context through the prism of its regional roots and
regionalization process, highlight the specifics of Daesh as compared to both
other regionalized violent Islamist movements and to al-Qaeda, and explain
transnationalization of Daesh beyond its region.
1. Jihadism and violent Islamist extremism: definitional aspects
Before turning to the subjectmatter, two important reservations need to bemade.
First, not any ethno-confessional insurgency fought byMuslims in aMuslim or
Muslim-minority country against national government or/and foreign forces can
be deemed a “jihadist insurgency”. Nor even any broader armed movement
driven by hybrid ideology that fully integrates the Islamist imperative and com-
bines religious and nationalist, or national liberation, elements qualifies. In fact,
neither most Muslim/ethnoseparatist insurgencies fighting on the periphery of
predominantly non-Muslim or multiconfessional states (a relatively standard
case, e. g., for much of Asia and Eurasia where almost every second country faces
this problem), nor such major Islamist/national-liberation movements fighting
occupation as the Palestinian Hamas qualify as “jihadist”. To qualify for a “ji-
hadist insurgency”, an armed group ormovement should not only be guided by an
explicit and dominant religious Islamist imperative, but also prioritize jihad by
violent means over other tasks, in an inherently cross-border, transnational con-
text.
Second, while the central subject of this article is violent religious extremism, it
is never hurts to stress that our focus is not on religion, but on the synthesis of
religion and ideology, understood and treated as a political category. This ap-
proach tries to avoid two extremes: (a) sharp juxtaposition of ideology (as dis-
tinctly political category) and religion (as spiritual, cultural and ethical category);5
(b) the Weberian understanding of religion as ideology, interpreted as an ethical
4 Cf. Neumann 2015b, p. 13.
5 See, e.g., Williams 1996, pp. 368–378.
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system guiding people!s behavior.6This article does not treat “Islam” as ideology.
Instead, it addresses a synthesis of religion and ideology in the form of highly
politicized religious/ideological currents, such as Salafist jihadism, as practiced by
most of the above-mentioned violent Islamist groups. In line with the French,
Russian and most other continental European schools of orientalist and Islamic
studies – and in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon tradition that normally does not
distinguish between Islamic fundamentalists and Islamists – there is also a dis-
tinction made here between religious fundamentalism (that may not necessarily
imply interest in politics and may prioritize theological, religious and ethical
issues) and Islamism and the Islamist ideology (as ideology of political active and
resurgent Islamic fundamentalism). Islamism itself is dominated by legalist socio-
political-religious movements that oppose existing order, but may be ready to
work within the system, principally in their own states, in order to change it (e.g.,
themajority of the “MuslimBrotherhood” branches).Of thewide range of groups
and currents associated with the more radical Islamism, only few resort to armed
violence, even fewer resort to indiscriminate violence against civilians, and even
fewer prioritise violence over social, missionary or political activities. The focus of
this piece is just on that latter segment.
2. Regionalization: from top-down to bottom-up
2.1. Top-down regionalization?
“Regionalization” has been the mainstream trend in transnational violent Is-
lamism for years. However, in the early 21st century the term was most commonly
used to refer to a top-down process of the al-Qaeda evolution in the early 21st
century. The approach that described al-Qaeda!s evolution primarily as the
process of top-down regionalization gradually replaced the “al-Qaedaization”
approach of the first post-9/11 years (that tended to see al-Qaeda almost every-
where, behind any act of Islamist terrorism and militancy in any regional con-
text).7 The “regionalization” approach that had prevailed in the mainstream US
and Western academic and security analysis by the 2010s, still left some direct
strategic and command role for the “al-Qaeda core”, or “al-Qaeda Central”,
leadership based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but acknowledged its relatively
declining role. It argued that the main level of al-Qaeda-affiliated and al-Qaeda-
inspired militant activity had been shifting from the “al-Qaeda core” towards
several relatively large, well-structured and organizationally coherent “regional
affiliates” based and primarily active in Muslim region: al-Qaeda in the Arabian
6 Cf. Weber 1993, id. 2005.
7 Cf. Gunaratna 2002.
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peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-
Qaeda in East Africa etc.8
On the one hand, at the time this shift of focus was a certain step forward from
primitive “al-Qaedaization” and was at least an effort to distinguish al-Qaeda
“regional affiliates” from (a) other genuine militant Islamist groups (such as
Hamas or Hizbullah) that have become gradually integrated into respective na-
tional political contexts and (b) from multiple localized “peripheral” Islamist-
separatist insurgencies across the world. The “top-down regionalization” ap-
proach also left some place for the so-called al-Qaeda!s “ideological adherents” –
small cells and individual adepts, including in the West people, “who know the
group only through its ideology to carry out violence in its name”, but interpreted
this as a sign of al-Qaeda!s weakness and organizational degradation explained
primarily as a direct result of counterterrorist pressure from theUnited States and
its allies.9
On the other hand, this search for relatively well-structured, organizationally
and regionally coherent “heirs” to the waning al-Qaeda, to an extent, reflected a
failure to grasp al-Qaeda!s key strength and themain direction of its evolution and
adaptation. Instead of investing in organizational development, al-Qaeda!s
ideological and strategic leadership emphasized and invested into the spread of
the “global jihad” ideology, leaving the structural, politico-military and tactical
forms and specifics to contextual conditions. Not surprisingly, the extent to which
all organizations referred to and designated as Al-Qaeda “regional affiliates” by
governments and security analysts actually qualified as such, and their role as al-
Qaeda!s direct and main successors could and have been disputed. One possible
exception has been the Yemen-based “al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula”
(AQAP). Of all the so-called al-Qaeda “regional affiliates”, AQAP is the only
one that both had a direct historical/genetic connection to the “al-Qaeda core”
throughYemeni and Saudi-based radical clerics and veteran-jihadists and posed a
serious threat beyond its region (e.g., in the form of pro-active ideological in-
doctrination of adepts, notably in the United States, by the radical preachers such
as AQAP-affiliated Anwar al-Awlaki and its English-language jihadist journal
“Inspire”).
Most other so-called al-Qaeda!s regional affiliates, be it in Iraq, Maghreb, the
Horn of Africa or Southeast Asia, were more the products of bottom-up regional
dynamics, than vehicles for the al-Qaeda decentralization. They all had strong and
deep roots in their respective regional, historical and political contexts, sometimes
activated by external interventions (as in the case of Iraq) or aggravated by them
(as in Somalia or Libya), and emerged as largely authentic movements. Their real
agenda had been and remained inextricably tied to respective regional/local
8 Cf. Rollins et al. 2011a; Rollins 2001b.
9 See National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: The White House,
2011), pp. 3, 19; cf. Rollins et al. 2011a, p. 30.
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conflicts and issues. Their declared links or pledges of allegiance to al-Qaeda have
been declarations of symbolic “loyalty” in support of shared ideological-religious
goals. Inmost cases, no solid or verifiable evidence has been provided to prove any
substantive operational, planning, logistical, financial or other direct links.10
A reference to al-Qaeda in the name of “al-Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI), quickly
dropped by the group following the death of its first leader Abu Musab az-Zar-
kawi in 2006, did not reflect its realmission and raison d!etre. Themain goal of this
most radical, Salafist-jihadist part (and increasingly the core) of the Sunni re-
sistance to US-led occupation of Iraq since 2003 and its proxy Shia-dominated
government, had been replacing a Western protectorate in Iraq with an Islamist
state. The absolute majority of its fighters and commanders had been comprised
by Iraqis. While, in contrast to AQI in Iraq or “ash-Shabaab” in Somalia, “Al-
Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) has not been specifically
tied to any single armed conflict and clearly aimed at a regional level, it was itself a
revised edition of theAlgerian Salafi Group for Call and Combat that in 1998 had
split fromGroupe IslamiqueArm- – themain rebel force in theAlgerian civil war.
Despite theAQIM!s 2006 pledge of loyalty to al-Qaeda, even theUS government
sources described the character of links as “nominal”, stating that “the group does
not appear to take directions from leaders in Afghanistan/Pakistan”.11 Some
radical Islamist networks in more distant regions, such as “Jemaah Islamiyya” in
SoutheastAsia, had either evolved for decadeswell before al-Qaedaor developed
in parallel to, rather than in coordination with, the latter, or both. Even the latest
case of “Jabhat an-Nusrah” in Syria that, after its formal recognition by al-Qaeda
religious-ideological leaderAyman az-Zawahiri in 2013, becomewidely known as
al-Qaeda!s “branch”, or “affiliate”, is quite ambiguous. This Salafist-jihadist
group emerged in late 2011 in the course and context of the Syrian civil war (at
first as a Syrian off-shoot of “Islamic State in Iraq”) and has since remained
largely confined to that context.12 The presence of foreign fighters in its ranks
(second in size only toDaesh) notwithstanding, “an-Nusrah” has been dominated
by Syrians and is far more “Syrian” than its main rival – the cross-border “The
Islamic State”, or Daesh.13 In practice, neither the degree of “an-Nusrah!s” sup-
port from foreign sources, including some regional states, nor its call for building
an Islamic sharia-based state in Syria and its imposition of sharia-based order in
areas under its control do not differ from the agenda and the way other relatively
large armed Islamist groups (such as “Jeish ul-Islam” or “Akhrar ash-Sham”)
operate in Syria. “An-Nusrah!s” continuing interest in the “al-Qaeda” brand and
10 Rollins 2001b, p. 5.
11 Rollins et al. 2011a, p. 19.
12 See “Jabhat al-Nusra”, in: The Mapping Militants project, Stanford University.
13 As of September 2014, 19 out of the Daesh top 20 leaders were from Iraq, while
only onewas Syrian. See: “Whoare ISIS!s top 20 leaders?”, in:Al-Arabiya, 19 September
2014.
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blessing could be partly explained by the need to counterbalance, in ideological
terms, its powerful and prevailing rival, Daesh.
2.2. Bottom-up regionalization
Regardless of how accurately the top-down regionalization scheme applied to
evolution of al-Qaeda, most major jihadist actors in the 21st century have, indeed,
been regionalizing. These processes, however, largely followed the opposite
pattern of bottom-up regionalization. In addition to the Daesh phenomenon in
Iraq and Syria as a show-case of such bottom-up regionalization in the broader
Middle Eastern context, this tendency has also fully manifested itself in the
evolution of several jihadist movements in regions beyond theArabMiddle East,
ranging from East/West Africa to South and Southeast Asia. This is as true for
“ash-Shabaab” or “Boko Haram” as it is for the Taliban across the Afghan-
Pakistani border, even as the variety of contextual conditions and specifics is
immense.
As noted above, even for most of those groups that had at some point declared
formal loyalty to al-Qaeda, bottom-up tendencies and regional dynamics pre-
vailed over top-down decentralization impulses. Nowhere did the bottom-up shift
from a more localized to a more regionalized movement manifest itself better
than in the case of the jihadist “ash-Shabaab” movement in Somalia. In a pro-
tracted and highly fragmented armed conflict in Somalia, a sequence of dys-
functional “transitional governments” supported mostly by neighboring states
and by “the international community” had for decades been confronted by Is-
lamist rebels. In 2006, the lead Islamist organization, the Islamic Courts Union,
with support from corporations of local traders, finally succeeded in establishing a
more stable control in the capital Mogadishu. It is only after this functional and
moremoderate Islamist regimewas forced out of power by the Ethiopianmilitary
intervention undertaken with the US covert support that the lead role in the
resistance shifted to the more radical splinter “ash-Shabaab” (“youth”) jihadist
movement. “Ash-Shabaab” strictly imposed sharia in areas under its control in
southern Somalia.14 While its targets have been primarily confined to Somalia
(where it mostly attacks the government, the Ethiopian military and the African
Union peace enforcement presence), since 2010, “ash-Shabaab” expanded its
activity to terrorist attacks in the neighboring states (Uganda, Burundi) that it
wanted towithdraw their forces fromSomalia. As a long-term goal, “as-Shabaab”
aims at building an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. It was not before the 2011
Kenyan intervention in southern Somalia, however, that “ash-Shabaab!s” leader
pledged loyalty to the already globally waning al-Qaeda in 2012.
14 For more details, see Marchal 2011.
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Another major African case in point is that of “BokoHaram” that has evolved
in northeastern Nigeria since the mid-2000s. The movement did not start as a
violent one and only turned tomilitancy and terrorism in 2009–2010, operates in a
relatively peripheral Muslim region, as compared to the Middle East, and has
limited transnational appeal. Nevertheless, Boko Haram overtook Daesh as the
most deadly terrorist group in the world in 2014. While Boko Haram accounted
for 6644 terrorist fatalities in 2014 (77 % of whom were private citizens), Daesh
was responsible for 6073 (with private citizens comprising 44 %).15As of the mid-
2010s, Boko Haram is not only more heavily oriented towards terrorist activity
against civilians and all non-combatants than Daesh or the Afghan Taliban, but
also displayed the most radical increase in terrorist activity. While this large
movement is strongly rooted in Nigerian socio-political context and operates
primarily at the national level, it is increasingly a networked and cross-border
phenomenon, has been gaining a higher international profile, mostly by demon-
strative acts of violence, and has a major regional potential.16
Compared to these more recent cases, the cross-border Taliban movement has
been a long-standing phenomenon. The movement!s emergence and evolution
was overwhelmingly rooted in and driven by contextually specific factors and
conditions, ranging from the dynamics of the intra-Afghan conflict since the early
1990s to support from Pakistan. The Taliban de facto government!s readiness to
host Bin Laden as a “paid guest” since 1996 notwithstanding, the movement has
always been strictly confined to its own region and, even more narrowly, to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan context. After the Taliban government (1996–2001) was
forced out by the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, and throughout the grad-
ually reemerging and escalating Taliban insurgency against the US and NATO
forces and the Afghan government in the early 21st century, the loyalty of various
parts of this hardly monolithic movement on either side of the border remained
firmly to its own charismatic Quetta-based leader Mullah Omar. The factors that
confined the Taliban strictly to the Afghanistan-Pakistan context included, but
were not limited to, increasingly cross-ethnic, but still heavily Pashtu-dominated
nature of the movement (that emerged as a mix of Islamism and Pashtu nation-
alism), the non-Salafist character of the Taliban religious fundamentalism (of the
Deobandi version of the Hanafi school that prevails in Afghanistan), and Paki-
stan!s determination to instrumentalize the movement for its regional goals (such
as increasing Islamabad!s leverage inAfghanistan, notably vis-a-vis India, shifting
the gravity center of thePashtu issue fromPakistan toAfghanistan etc.).17Neither
the new military advances by the Afghan Taliban since 2014, nor even its split,
following the confirmation of Mullah Omar!s death, could change the move-
ment!s central focus on the armed conflict in Afghanistan and on sharia-based
15 See Global Terrorism Index 2015, p. 14.
16 See De Montclos 2014b; id. 2014a.
17 For a balanced account on the Taliban evolution, see, e. g., Rubin 2015.
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governance in areas under its control. Since 2015, the mainstream Taliban faction
even got in conflict with the more ambitious, but not endemic and less locally
rooted “Vilayat Khorasan” project involving Daesh(-inspired) militants in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan.18
As it could be seen from above, cross-border, regionally based Islamist in-
surgencies with state-building ambitions could be traced in various regions be-
yond theArabMiddle East. However, this only tends to become an issue ofmajor
international security concern in regional contexts marred by a combination of
chronic state weakness or failure, protracted major conflicts and all-out civil wars
and high degree of transnationalization, including covert state support, or even
formal internationalization (foreign military presence). It is in these conditions
that the bottom-up regionalization of a radical Islamist movement leads to mul-
tiplication and qualitative upgrade rather than erosive fragmentation and decline
of its military-political potential and militant/terrorist activity.
Of all regionally based and regionalizing violent Islamist movements, the Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Levant, or Daesh, has not only been the most explicitly
“jihadist”, but also the only one with ideological ambitions extending beyond the
Iraq-Syria context and the Middle East at large. Even so, the formation and
evolution of Daesh is also a major show-case of bottom-up regionalization, not a
case of top-down breakaway protrusion or natural progression from al-Qaeda.
The special focus onDaesh in this article ismerited by itsdual character as both (a)
an epitome case of bottom-up regionalization and (b) a cutting edge of mobi-
lization and transformation of transnational violent jihadism and its main current
center of gravity, as of the mid-2010s.
3. Daesh as a case of bottom-up regionalization
In fact, no other major regionalizing Islamist movement has been so strongly
driven by factors internal to the countries (Iraq and Syria) and the region in
question (the Middle East) as Daesh has, even as some of these dynamics were
initially set in motion or catalyzed by the external intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Regionalization of a civil war in Syria has also largely, although not exclusively,
been a product of intra-regional dynamics. Acting in two (semi)failed state con-
texts – in Iraq as a chronically failing post-intervention state and in Syria seriously
weakened by a heavily transnationalized civil war –Daesh provides an evenmore
impressive example of a regional militant-terrorist movement with a powerful
18 “VilayatKhorasan” (the “Islamic” name for bothAfghanistan and Pakistan) is the
first formally recognized Daesh “branch” outside the Arab world, officially announced
by Daesh on 26 January 2015. While the scale of its presence in Afghanistan is hyped, it
has been in conflict with the mainstream part of the Taliban insurgency, while attracting
some ex-Taliban fighters and splinter elements. See, e. g., Ruttig 2015.
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ideology, major state-building ambitions and quasi-state potential than the cross-
border activity and phenomenon of the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
context. The bottom-up regionalization process that led to the rise ofDaesh in the
Iraq-Syria context manifested itself in terms of the main driving factors for the
Daesh evolution, the main area and level of its most direct and strongest impact
and implications, and also at the ideological-religious level.
The factors and dynamics most relevant to emergence and regionalization of
Daesh may be grouped at two levels: micro-regional (national) and macro-re-
gional. The process started (in Iraq) and has been ongoing at the micro-regional
level (in Iraq and Syria) since the mid-2000s and remains firmly rooted in and
primarily based at that level. The ongoing bottom-up regionalization of Daesh
was, however, qualitatively upgraded and amplified by dramatic processes at the
macro-regional level that merged together in the early 2010s to produce a sys-
temic regional crisis in theMiddle East and itself became amajormanifestation of
that region-wide crisis.
3.1. Micro-regional level
The so-called Islamic State, or Daesh, originated in the early 21st century in post-
intervention Iraq which has remained its main center of gravity through the mid-
2010s and where it has acquired and kept a lasting support base among Sunni
Arabs. The twomain Iraq-based roots ofDaeshwere the total collapse of the Iraqi
state as a result of the US-led 2003 intervention and the ensuing rise of sectarian
dynamics that quickly filled the vacuum in the form of the Shia-centric state
building and growing Sunni estrangement from and opposition to that project.
This refers to widespread, genuine grievances and discontent by various groups of
Iraqi Sunnis ranging from the former Baathists to tribal groups to Islamists with
their growing political and socio-economicmarginalization and repression in Iraq
since 2003. Resentment of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs toward the increasingly Shia-
centered “dysfunctional order” in post-2003 Iraq took different forms ranging
from reluctant acceptance/neutrality to armed violence, including in extreme
forms. However, it also gradually radicalized both in its non-violent part and
inside the Iraqi Sunni initially very fragmented insurgency. Ultimately, this led to
increasing consolidation of themost determined andmilitarily capable part of the
Sunni resistance in Iraq around a Salafist-jihadist agenda and movement em-
bodied by the “Islamic State in Iraq” (ISI) group, previously known as “al-Qaeda
in Iraq”.
This discontent and radicalization helped feed the anti-U.S. insurgency, con-
tinued to accumulate during the rule of the unpopular Iraqi regime of Nuri al-
Maliki (2006–2014) inherited from the foreign security presence and charac-
terized by growing authoritarian tendencies, limited functionality and low le-
gitimacy, and did not abide under the successor government of Haider al-Abadi
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(since September 2014).The growth of Daesh and its major advances in Iraq
became the most extreme form of this longer and broader phenomenon of the
Sunni rejection that played a central role in its emergence and remained a major
factor in its evolution. The capture of Mosul by the Islamic State in June 2014
cannot be understood outside the decade-long series of the battles and atrocities
in Fallujah, the rise and radicalization of the Iraqi insurgency in 2006–2007 and the
broader Sunni protest movement of the early 2010s.19
The escalating and increasingly sectarian civil war in the neighboring Syria
since 2011 further alienated most Syrian Sunnis from the minority rule Asad
regime and radicalized many followers of the more moderate Islamist move-
ments, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to form or join a range of more radical,
jihadist groups. While the latter started to be beefed up, both for ideological
reasons and as the most efficient anti-government fighters, by anti-Asad regional
powers (notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar), the central government turned to
support from Shia actors across the region ranging from Iran to Lebanese Hiz-
bullah. The rapid sectarianization and regionalization of the internal conflict in
Syria, amidst its multiple other internal socio-political fault lines, growing com-
plexity and fragmentation of violence, and the narrowing space of governance
provided an ideal opportunity for the “Islamic State in Iraq” to expand across the
border, secure a haven, build a second country-base in Syria, enhance its financial
base by getting control of the cross-border smuggling of oil and to upgrade itself,
first, to a regional movement of “Iraq and Levant” and, next, to a reincarnation of
the Islamic Caliphate in part of its historical lands.
Theworst thing about sectarianism in Iraq (and Syria) – is that it become a self-
perpetuating cycle: suppression of (part of) a large sub-national community fu-
eled radicalization and increasingly sectarian response (with Daesh as its most
extreme and violent form), which was then often countered by means that con-
tributed to reproducing and even reinforcing the conditions that gave rise to the
Islamic State in the first place. For instance, from an Iraqi Sunni point of view, the
government-sanctioned “Hashd al-Shaabi” (the mass mobilization of volunteers
and old and new Shiamilitias to repel the Islamic State, following the fatwa call by
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in June 2014) has become “the most serious de-
fense of Shia-centric state building” and as much an expression of the rise of
sectarianism in Iraq as the Islamic State itself.20
However, it would be inaccurate to reduceDaesh in Iraq and/or Syria to both a
product and a reproducer of sectarianism alone. Its ultra-sectarian character
should be analyzed along with a combination of at least three other key charac-
teristics. On the one hand, they include (1) extreme religious fundamentalism that
totally rejects anything secular, including the very idea of the Iraqi (Syrian or any
other) nation-state and merges with (2) extreme violence that goes beyond more
19 For more details, see Haddad 2016; Mansour 2016; Haddad 2011.
20 Haddad Fanar 2016, p. 1.
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regular combat or even terrorism as standard tactics of many militant insurgent/
terrorist groups and acquires a genocidal/cleansing dimension (especially against
the Shias and other Muslim “apostates”). On the other hand, the Daesh phe-
nomenon in Iraq (and in Syria) itself embodies (3) a reaction to protracted con-
flict, routinization of violence, chaos, collapsed or fragmented order. This reaction
took the form of religious/ideologically-based efforts to establish “alternative”
basic governance, impose Islamist sharia-based law and order, start partial re-
construction of infrastructure (beyond oil production and gas processing to in-
clude water supply pipelines) and provide minimal social welfare.21 For Daesh,
this latter pillar has notmerely been ameans to survive and function as an efficient
military actor in order to gain more territorial and population control through
fighting (jihad), but underscores themovement!s central ideological, religious and
politico-military focus on building a region-based “Caliphate” extending “from
Aleppo to Diyala”22 as the center of “true” Islamic order and governance and a
destination for hijrah (emigration) for Muslims from elsewhere.
3.2. Macro-regional level
In the 2010s, “Islamic State in Iraq” did not simplymechanically expand to a cross-
border “grey area” haven in the neighboring Syria as another failing statemired in
a major civil war. The movement!s evolution and further regionalization was
qualitatively amplified by – and became an integral part of and, to an extent,
hostage to – the broader socio-political processes at the macro-regional level.
Parts of the Middle East have been areas of instability, particularly traumatic
and painful modernization, deep social problems and continuing and new armed
conflicts throughout the early 21st century.However, in the early 2010s theMiddle
East entered a full-scale systemic crisis that affected states and societies and
permeated politics, any definition and aspect of security, and social economy
across the region. Itsmainmanifestations includedmajor andnearly simultaneous
social (socio-political) upheavals that became known collectively as the “Arab
spring”; the fundamental crisis ofmany existing states, especially of the republican
regimes; the ever intensifying transnationalization of most social processes, in-
cluding social protest, political/religious violence and extremism; growing ten-
sions and increasing competition for influence among key regional powers and the
accelerating erosion of, and shift in, regional balances of power.
21 For a detailed overview, see: “The Islamic State (IS) Establishes Itself In Iraq And
Syria”, in: The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry & Analysis
Series Report no. 1126, 22 October 2014.
22 Declaration of the reestablishment of the “Caliphate” by ISIS spokesman: Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, “This is the Promise of Allah”, Al-I!tisam Media
Foundation Twitter account, 29 June 2014 (account suspended by Twitter).
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Elements of these trends could be traced here and there and accumulated in the
region for decades. However, in the 2010s they burst simultaneously and merged
together to produce a new quality. The overall crisis in regional security, region-
wide instability, a wave of internal upheavals and/or heavily transnationalized and
internationalized civil wars, and intractable regional rivalries reached a scale and
intensity that neared the prospects of region-wide destabilization and dis-
integration of several states at once (Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen). In all of
them, violent extremism of the most radical Islamist type, transnationalized to
varying degree, has emerged as the worstmanifestation of such systemic crisis and
amajor challenge to state and society. This extreme Islamist militancy in the form
of cross-border and more broadly transnationalized movements should be seen
more as a product and manifestation of these broader, underlying processes and
shifts rather than as the cause. However, once firmly taking root, this type of
violent extremist actor – most clearly embodied by ISIS/Daesh – itself became a
powerful driver and catalyst of the overall systemic crisis – both as a generator of
armed violence, including extreme violence against civilians, and as an active
challenger of the regional order and alternative quasi-state-builder.
The “Arab Spring” as a major catalyst and manifestation of the region-wide
systemic crisis not only helped set in motion one of the two main country-specific
contexts for the evolution of Daesh – the rise of social, initially more pro-de-
mocracy than fundamentalist protest in Syria followed by rigid counter-reaction
by the Asad government and turning into anti-government violence whose sec-
ular component gradually degraded to give way to the more and more radical
violent Islamism of the increasingly sectarian and jihadist bent.More broadly, the
violent extremist/quasi-state Daesh phenomenon has been as much an integral
part and manifestation of the systemic crisis in the Middle East as the socio-
political phenomenon of the “Arab Spring”. Furthermore, at the macro-regional
level, Daesh may also be seen as a non-system (counter-)reaction to the “Arab
Spring” and especially to the role played in the latter by reformist Islamist
movements. In terms of ideology andmethods employed to challenge the system,
the emergence of Daesh could be described as the opposite end of the pendulum
swing, as reinstating the need for “change through jihad” in reaction to the cul-
mination of “change through reform/peace” in “Muslim Brotherhood” taking
power democratically in Egypt. Daesh emerged as an assertive rival of “the Arab
spring” that was (a) hyperconservative in ideological outlook, (b) extremely vi-
olent and ferocious in its methods; but at the same time (c) highly competitive
with the “Arab Spring” actors in mastering the communication, outreach and
mobilization advantages of the digital age.23
23 For more details on the Daesh information and communication strategy and tools,
see Atwan 2015.
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3.3. Impact and solutions within the region
In terms of the overall impact, the gravest and most direct implications of the
Daesh activity once it has taken its full shape affect, first and foremost, the region
itself. It is within its region, that had already been the world!s main center of
terrorist and militant activity for much of the early 21st century, that the Daesh
military advanced coupledwith amajor quasi-state experiment threatened to deal
a massive, if not necessarily final, blow to two already failing or seriously weak-
ened states at once and thus to add a new quality to the broader regional desta-
bilization. It is within the region, primarily in the two countries in point, that the
impact of the Daesh violence, including against civilians, has been concentrated.
The Daesh marked, extreme radicalism and brutality of its methods also stem
not just from the extreme fundamentalism of its religious ideology that claims
literal return to the tough times of the early Islam, but from contemporary re-
gional dynamics and can be partly explained at the regional level. For instance,
Daesh!s extremely harsh position on the excommunication of all Shia and other
“apostates” and meticulous implementation of this policy in practice continue
from and could be tracked back to its experience in Iraq!s war and from the
marked sectarianism of its ISI/AQI. This was aggravated by the Daesh involve-
ment in the increasingly sectarian Syrian conflict that, in view of growing med-
dling by the Gulf states, on the one hand, and the covert involvement of Iran and
the Lebanese-basedHizbullah, was also increasingly becoming part of the region-
wide sectarian tensions. Not surprisingly, so far, the bulk of victims of individual
and mass killings on the Daesh-controlled territory have been Muslim “apos-
tates”. Daesh!s hyper-sectarianism overlaps with, builds upon and itself promotes
region-wide sectarian Sunni-Shia divisions and violence (further reignited, at the
inter-state level, by the new Saudi-Iranian rift of the early 2016). As mentioned
above, in ideological-religious terms, the extreme rigidity of Daesh and its self-
upgrade to “the Islamic Caliphate” was the most radical counterreaction to the
driving forces and political-ideological impulses behind the “Arab spring” per-
ceived by extreme Salafist jihadists as a “trait” by Muslim apostates. For them,
that massive “trait” actualized the need for direct pursuit of Caliphate through
ever more rigorous and brutal jihad, literally reproducing norms of war of the
times of the early Islam.
The major implication of understanding the regional roots, base and the bot-
tom-up regionalization of Daesh is that efforts to weaken it militarily from the
outside may diminish its territorial control, cut its financial base and reduce the
inflows of foreign fighters,24but could not remove the deeply entrenched factors at
national/micro-regional level that gave rise to this phenomenon in the first place
24 According to Pentagon, in April 2016 the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and
Syria has dropped over the past year from roughly 2000 down to 200 a month. See
Gibbons-Neff 2016.
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or macro-regional dynamics that facilitated its further regionalization. Address-
ing the Daesh challenge at the broader international/global level would not solve
the issue of sectarianism in Iraq or Syria, nor that of the legitimacy of the Iraqi
(and Syrian) state. This task requires some form of a regional compact and, above
all, country-based/national solutions (power-sharing, more pluralistic systems
balancing between state functionality and decentralization). These could result
from long, internationally mediated negotiation process, as in the Syria case, or,
perhaps, even from some newmajor social upheaval (as suggested by the storming
of Iraqi parliament on 30 April 2016 by supporters of Iraq!s only relatively mass-
based social movement led by Ayatollah Muqtada as-Sadr, the only Iraq Shia
leader with at least some potential of broader cross-sectarian appeal).
4. Daesh and al-Qaeda
Much of the debate on theDaesh ideology not only neglected and de-emphasized
the movement!s deep regional roots, but also, with rare notable exceptions,25 has
been practically hijacked by the focus on differences, competition and outbidding
between Daesh and al-Qaeda at the “global jihad” level.
Indeed, there are some important ideological and practical nuances between
the two.
– In contrast to al-Qaeda and its followers, Daesh does not see “Islamic Ca-
liphate” as an abstract, distant, extraterritorial and utopian end-goal. Instead, it
has been building a physical, territorially-based Islamist Caliphate here and
now, in its own region. For Daesh, establishing and consolidating “Caliphate”
as a state emulating the early Islamic model comes as a more important and
more urgent priority than even the “global jihad”, including against theWest.26
Even as Daesh issued a call for attacks in theWest on 22 September 2014,27 the
movement!s primary focus firmly remains on the areas and the region where
the “Caliphate” is being built.
– Both theDaesh version of theCaliphate and its general appeal are considerably
more populist and grass-root, at least in its own sectarian context – a sort of
“people!s Caliphate” for disenchanted (Sunni) Muslims, as opposed to original
al-Qaeda!s relatively elitist message and structure based on Sayyed Qutb!s
vision of elitist Islamist vanguard cells purifying themselves of the “ocean” of
ignorant and materialistic “masses”.28 In some way, this part of the Daesh
25 SeeHaykel 2015; see also prof. BernardHaykel quoted in:Wood 2015; Carmon et
al. 2014.
26 As stated inDaesh!s journal inEnglish “Dabiq”: “The Islamic State [comes] before
al-malhama [the battle against the Crusaders].” (Dabiq, no. 3, p. 5.)
27 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 2014.
28 See Qutb 1980, pp. 12, 20, 47, 79–80.
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phenomenon could even be seen as a continuation, in a different context, of the
line in transnational jihadist movement that had been earlier embodied by
Abdullah Azzam (a major ideologue and practitioner of “armed jihad” who
had fought against the Soviets inAfghanistan).While having had reinterpreted
“armed jihad” as “an individual duty of all Muslims” (rather than a collective
duty that could be delegated to someone else), Azzam had also emphasized
mass armed resistance “in defence of Muslim lands” and a more populist
agenda.29 This line stood in certain contrast to that of Osama bin Laden – an
elitist, globally-oriented financial mediator and coordinator of jihad in Af-
ghanistan who, following the death of the more popular Azzam in 1989, in-
herited and led the left-over transnational jihadist networks and turned them
into what later became al-Qaeda.
– While universalist extraterritorial al-Qaeda emphasized the importance of
doctrine in its ideology and rhetoric, territorially based Daesh has prioritized
harsh enforcement and implementation of rigid interpretation of Islamic law
through its governance and social policies and practices.
Sporadic political-military tensions between the two currents could be seen, from
time to time, on the ground in the Iraq-Syria context, including in the form of
violent clashes betweenDaesh and al-Qaeda-affiliated “Jabhat an-Nusrah”.Also,
like waves, these rifts in some form projected themselves into other, more distant
conflict areas, catalyzing new splits among local/regional violent Islamists (in
places ranging from the Afghanistan-Pakistan context30 to Russia!s North Cau-
casus31). However, in practical terms, these nuances should not be overestimated.
Even in the Iraq-Syria context, operational fighting alliances between groups
loyal to al-Qaeda and Daesh have not been infrequent on the ground; jihadist
groups also at times cooperated and coordinated their activities in other ways
(including by establishing joint sharia courts).
More generally, however, when it comes to trying to explain the Daesh phe-
nomenon, the “Daesh vs al-Qaeda” angle appears to be the wrong way to start, in
the first place. The explanation of Daesh has to start at the regional level (see
previous section), not with how it competes with al-Qaeda for primacy in “global
jihad”. The nuances between the two are certainly important – but they are more
of an outcome than substance of the process of theDaesh evolution from bottom-
up regionalization to the broader transnationalization beyond the Iraq-Syria
context.
While Daesh epitomizes the bottom-up regionalization pattern, that pattern,
as noted above, also characterizes several other major radical Islamist groups in
different regions. Daesh, however, stands out even among all other most active
29 See Azzam 2002.
30 See McFate / Denaburg / Forrest 2015; see also note 13.
31 See Stepanova 2015.
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and violent territorially-based violent Islamist movements on a number of counts.
All of such regional or regionalizing movements have also managed, to varying
extent, to establish a solid financial basis, run basic governance and even engage in
more ambitious state-building experiments. Daesh, however, not only built an
army that has been one of the main combatants in the world!s two most intense
armed conflicts simultaneously and, at its peak, displayed the capacity to conduct
offensive military operations in two different theaters at once (having captured
Ramadi in Iraq!s Anbar province and Palmyra in Syria in May 2015). It also
claimed direct pursuit and legacy of a revived ”Islamic caliphate” at part of its
“historical lands”, has most persistently put it into life in practice, at the military,
administrative, social and other levels and attracted the largest inflow of foreign
fighters since the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s (see the next section).
In sum, Daesh is a category of its own. On the one hand, it differs from other
regionally-based violent Islamist movements by its claim for supreme legitimacy
and broader transnational appeal – to the point of becoming, in themid-2010s, the
cutting edge of the “global jihad” movement, or, using al-Baghdadi!s own words,
“the spearhead” in “the war of every Muslim in every place”, “the war of the
people of faith against the people of disbelief”.32 On the other hand, Daesh is in
several important respects distinct, in both ideology and practice, from the most
globalized, extraterritorial al-Qaeda-centered movement. However, over-em-
phasizing differences and competition between Daesh and al-Qaeda at the
transnational level may distract attention from a more important question.
Daesh did not emerge as a global phenomenon. Much like other regionally-
based violent Islamist groups, Daesh originally emerged as a regional movement,
driven by regional dynamics, regional conflicts (including those unleashed by
external interventions), gravely facilitated by and further undermining collapse or
weakness of states of the region, fueled by and itself further fueling regional
sectarianism. The key question is: what turned this regionally-based movement
into the new cutting edge of “global jihad” as a movement and ideology?
5. Explaining transnationalization of Daesh beyond the region
Considering the ideological, religious and symbolic centrality of theArabMiddle
East for the ideology and practice of transnational Salafist jihadism, the Daesh
phenomenon simply could not stay confined to Levant, nor even to the broader
Middle East. Earlier, at the turn of the century, the 9/11 attacks in the United
States that had put al-Qaeda in the global limelight were the first anti-system
32 “March Forth Whether Light or Heavy”, Transcript of an audio speech by Abu
Bakr Al-Baghdadi, Al-Furqan media company, 14 May 2015, reproduced in: MEMRI,
“In new audio speech, Islamic State (ISIS) leader Al-Baghdadi issues call to arms to all
Muslims”, 14 May 2015.
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event of that scale already designed, perceived and understood in the context of
“global information village”. More than a decade later, the originally and in-
herently regional Daesh phenomenon evolved at what could be described as the
next stage of the increasingly dense glocal (global-local) information and political
space and new opportunities for manipulating it. The widely available digital age
tools facilitated the spread of popularity, appeal and attraction of Daesh far be-
yond the original core countries, across and well beyond theMiddle East at large.
These accumulated as a result of a combination of Daesh!s military successes on
the ground in two major armed conflicts, its growing territorial control, its ex-
tremely rigid religious-social norms and practices and far-reaching state-building
ambitions, coupled with ultra-modern outreach and propaganda appeal and
techniques. This fell at fertile ground at the time when mixed outcomes of the
“Arab Spring” increased disillusion and disappointment with its goals – and
methods – among some segments ofMuslim societies in this and other parts of the
world and in Muslim diaspora.
The growing importance of the region-based Daesh for the “global jihad”
movement manifested itself in two main ways.
First, the influx of foreign jihadist fighters into Syria and Iraq intensified, with
many of them, especially from the West, sharing and promoting a distinctively
universalist agenda. Foreign jihadists had been present at the Iraqi front for over a
decade (and comprised 4–10 % of Daesh!s early predecessor “al-Qaeda in
Iraq”).33They had also fought on the side of the radical armed opposition in Syria
since the early 2010s, especially in the ranks of groups such as mostly Syria-based
and explicitly jihadist “Jabhat an-Nusrah” or in affiliated formations, such as
“Jaish al-Muhajireen val!Ansar” (“army of migrants and followers”), well before
“Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI)moved across the border from Iraq. However, the ISI
expansion into Syria, its following rise as Daesh, its very self-generating/bottom-
up appeal coupled with robust army-style military capacity, higher resolve to use
demonstratively extreme violence, greater ambitions and more thorough practi-
ces regarding the imposition of “Islamic order”, and effective outbidding vis-a-vis
local rivals, not only shifted the main inflows towards Daesh (with many foreign
fighters already in the area simply shifting loyalties in its favor), but also led to a
major increase in the overall numbers of newcomers. While the overall numbers,
proportion and national composition of foreign fighters have been changing dy-
namically, two things became increasingly clear even at the pre-”Caliphate” stage
of the Daesh evolution. First, while its army-style combat potential and military
success were, to a significant extent, attributed to the presence of the Iraqi ex-
Baathist professional security and military cadre, including at the top Daesh
command level (possibly comprising up to a third of Al-Baghdadi!s deputies in
late 2014), foreign jihadists appeared to have been playing a disproportionately
large role in atrocities against civilians, including beheadings. Second, it is the
33 Cf. Baker / Hamilton 2006.
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influx of foreign jihadist fighters, with their broader, more universalist agenda,
that provided the region-based ISIS/L its first practical link to a truly globalized
agenda.
Second, it is at this stage (e.g. well after the “Islamic State of Iraq” had ex-
panded to Syria, become the lead jihadist force there and the main center of
gravity for incoming jihadist flows from abroad, at the expense of local jihadist
rivals such as “Jabhat an-Nusrah”, and upgraded itself to “Islamic State of Iraq
and ash-Sham”), not before, that the collision and competition with al-Qaeda
started to become an issue. Even that collision, as noted above, did not initially
emerge as some theoretical/theological exchange at an internet jihadist portal or
elsewhere – it was preceded and catalyzed by Daesh!s far more earthly com-
petition with “Jabhat-an-Nusrah” on the ground in Syria and the decision by al-
Qaeda!s ideological leadership (embodied by Ayman az-Zawahiri) to side with
the latter.34
Against this background, the significance and centrality of the formal decla-
ration of the Caliphate on 29 June 201435 (and of the Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi as a “caliph”) could not be overestimated. While hardly a radical
threshold – rather, a product and fixation of a longer-term trend, the invocation of
the “Islamic caliphate” as an ideological-religious construction and an experi-
ment in its literal implementation could be seen precisely as a way to reconcile the
inherently, essentially regional nature of the Daesh phenomenon (resulting from
years of gradual bottom-up regionalization) with its growing importance and
increasingly central role for the “global jihad” movement. This central role and
global appeal – a long way from what first emerged years ago as a radical core of
the Iraqi Sunni resistance –was a cross-cutting theme of al-Baghdadi!s first speech
as self-declared “caliph” on 1 July 2014,
OMuslims everywhere… raise your head high, for today – by Allah!s grace – you have a
state and khila¯fah, whichwill return your dignity,might, rights, and leadership. It is a state
where theArab and non-Arab, thewhiteman andblackman, the easterner andwesterner
are all brothers. It is a khila¯fah that gathered theCaucasian, Indian,Chinese, Sha¯mı¯, Iraqi,
Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribı¯ (North African), American, French, German, and Aus-
tralian…Therefore, rush OMuslims to your state… a state for all Muslims… Syria is not
for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah!s.36
“Caliphate” has become themain form andDaesh!s take on the global jihad.With
the “Caliphate” announced and in place on its physical territorial base in Iraq and
Syria, regional drivers and “global jihad” ideology become not only reconciled,
but also mutually reinforcing. The critical importance of holding and expanding
34 For more details, see Bayoumi / Harding 2014; Simonelli 2014.
35 See al-Adnani, “This is the Promise of Allah”, op. cit. (note 22).
36 Amirul Mu!Minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi 2015, p. 5.
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actual territorial control as a base for the “Islamic state”, the need to be region-
ally-based in a physical sense, should be particularly stressed as an essential, sine
qua non condition for declaring a caliphate even in the mainstream Islamic tra-
ditions (something that al-Qaeda, for instance, lacked in principle).
In practice, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi!s formal declaration of himself as the first
“Caliph” in a thousand years reinforced Daesh!s integration into and lead role in
“global jihad” by (a) catalyzing an even more intense inflow of fighters, (b)
stimulating a wave of allegiance pledges to “Caliphate” from radical Islamist
groups of all sizes and types at levels from local to regional and across regional
contexts and (c) formally launching its own major transnational migration/settler
project.
(a) Direct pursuit and declaration of the “Caliphate”, supported by military
advances and territorial control in a key Muslim region, reinforced its out-
reach and appealwell beyond the core area of Iraq andSyria andmadeDaesh
a magnet for the largest flow of foreign jihadist fighters ever. If, before the
declaration of the “Caliphate”, they numbered approximately 12000, still
mostly in Syria, by the end of 2015, the overall numbers could be anywhere
between 27000 and 3100037 (that appeared to be the peak number, as foreign
fighters started to leave the area and the inflow of newcomers declined since
air strikes supported by ground operations by region-based anti-Daesh forces
intensified in late 2015–2016). Still, the estimated peak numbers considerably
exceeded the scale of flows of foreign fighters during anti-Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan.38 While militants from various active local fronts, both from
elsewhere in the Middle East (the origin of the majority of foreign fighters)
and from areas of low-intensity, Islamist-separatist conflicts on the periphery
ofMuslim-minority states of Asia and Eurasia, have been in high demand on
the ground, in the battlefield, the role of the influx of jihadists from theWest
(even as they comprised between a fifth and a quarter of all foreign fighters)
was indispensable as a link to “global jihad”, in view of their generally more
explicitly globalist agenda and universalist outlook.
(b) A parallel phenomenon of a parade of pledges of allegiance or loyalty to
Daesh among themore locally based violent Islamist actors around the world
could, in themoremundane sense, be partly explained by the former!s appeal
as a major politico-military and propaganda success story. These have been
pledges not just in the name of an ideological current and symbolic figure or
entity claiming to advance towards “caliphate” to be acquired in some distant
future (as had been the case with local pledges of loyalty to “extraterritorial”
Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the 2000s), but to the “the Islamic state” here and
now. The attraction of the “Caliphate”, however, also has a purely religious/
37 Cf. Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters in
Syra and Iraq, The Soufan Group report, December 2015.
38 Cf. Neumann 2015a.
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ideological explanation. Once established, caliphate activates a religious
obligation for all righteous Muslims – on condition that they take its new
“edition” seriously – to pledge loyalty. This is not to mention that it also
activates a large portion of Sharia that can only be exercised by and under the
Caliphate (which also partly explains some of the Daesh repressive “law
enforcement” and social practices against “apostates”, prisoners, slaves etc.).
(c) Finally, Daesh has also become a nascent transnational migration/settler
project. One particular aspect, specific to Daesh as a quasi-state and an
experiment in Islamist state-building, is the emphasis that its propaganda and
ideology have placed upon marketing the “Caliphate” in the Iraq-Syria
context as a final destination and a physical, rather than imagined, “promised
land” for disenchanted Muslims from anywhere in the world. In al-Baghda-
di!s words: “OMuslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah
(emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the
land of Islam is obligatory”.39 Daesh!s broader message was not just for the
militants to fight, but also for civilians, including the fighters! family mem-
bers, certain categories of professionals, as well as women and families with
kids and other “right Muslims” to come and populate areas under their
control (to live, work, provide administrative and technical skills, ensure
logistical support for the war effort, do business, have kids). This often took
the formof specific “targeted calls” for certain categories of newcomers: e.g.,
the July 2014 “special call” was “to the scholars, "fuqaha¯! (experts in Islamic
jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with
military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and en-
gineers of all different specializations and fields”40 ; there were also repeated
calls for professionals, as well as specifically for women and families to arrive.
Paraphrasing a classic from a different cultural tradition, “Caliphate must be
peopled”. In sum, what made Daesh a qualitatively new phenomenon was
also its potential – not yet realized even in half – to become a major ideo-
logically-driven migration/settler movement and project in the Middle East
(based on a radical Islamist ideology, value and governance system).
In combination, these three drivers helped create a centrifugal system, with the
physical Caliphate in Syria and Iraq at its core, reinforced by inflows of foreign
fighters from and beyond the Middle East, complemented by some flow of
Muslim settlers, and extending to many more localized armed Islamist groups,
cells andmovements in different contexts via the “parade of pledges of loyalty” to
Daesh.
Ironically, the Caliphate factor as the Daesh main “portal” to “global jihad” as
an ideology and amovement is not only itsmain ideological/religious strength and
39 Amirul Mu!Minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi 2015, p. 5.
40 Ibid., see also Dabiq, no. 2 and 3.
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link to global jihad, but also its biggest vulnerability. Once having declared a
“Caliphate”, to remain legitimate Daesh now becomes dependent on retaining
and expanding territorial control in a certain region (not to mention that this in
turn requires some top-down governance/administrative/military structure de-
priving the movement of an organizational advantages of flatter underground
networks). This dependence, driven by the movement!s religious ideology, re-
inforces the imperative to stick to the territory under Daesh control at any cost.
This, however, also means that if they are prevented from expanding and holding
to a physical territory and even deprived of a significant territorial control – this
would not only diminish or neutralize their physical capacity to fight and engage in
other forms of violence, but, more importantly, can seriously, if not decisively,
undermine their ideological legitimacy in and beyond the region.
6. Conclusion
The explanation of the Daesh phenomenon has to start with the concrete region
and at the regional level, not at the level of “global jihad” as a universalist
ideological-religious movement. All contextual specifics notwithstanding,
through the process of its evolution from “Islamic state in Iraq” into the self-
proclaimed “Caliphate” with a territorial base in good half of Iraq and Syria,
Daesh shared important similarities with several other major region-based ji-
hadist actors. These could be summed up as the shared “bottom-up regionaliza-
tion” dynamics.
What turned this regionally-based movement into the new cutting edge of
“global jihad” as a movement and ideology?
Oneway to explain that suggested in this article is to seeDaesh as a cumulative
result of the interaction/merger of three major, cutting-edge trends in the evo-
lution of transnational violent Islamism-jihadism in the early 21st century.
(a) The first trend is the bottom-up “regionalization” process of violent Islamist
movements briefly described above.While it can be traced in severalMuslim-
populated regions, in the Middle Eastern context, it has been spurred and
gravely aggravated by two of the world!s three most intense, deadly and
heavily transnationalized armed conflicts of the past decade and a half (in
Iraq after 2003 and in Syria since 2011), state failure and disfunctionality,
deep internal sectarian divisions, amplified by meddling by regional powers!
and other regional sectarian forces, and the ideological/religious counter-
reaction to the “Arab spring” of the early 2010s.
(b) The second trend has developed in parallel, largely manifested itself in other
regions and followed the opposite, decentralization direction. This refers to
what could be called network fragmentation of “global jihad”movement – the
emergence of small, autonomous, self-generating homegrown jihadist cells,
often linked to the “movement” and to each other primarily or solely by the
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“global jihad” ideology, but seeing themselves as network agents and plan-
ning and undertakingmilitant-terrorist activity, at homeor abroad, as parts of
a global network. The sine qua non condition and the main “glue” for such
network fragmentation could only be a universalist ideology of a radically
anti-system type (at present, this role at the global level is played by religious-
extremist ideology of “global jihad”). While such fragmented cells could be
found in many countries, the ones with the most universalist outlook and
agenda are actually to be found among the homegrown, but transnationally
inspired jihadist cells and followers in theWest and the “globalNorth”.While
previously inspired primarily by al-Qaeda-style Salafist-jihadist vision (and
more or less confirming to jihadist doctrines such as Abu as-Suri!s concept of
“jihad by individual cells”),41 in the mid-2010s, the main cutting edge and
center of gravity for this type of cell and individual mobilization in ideo-
logical, symbolic and organizational terms has effectively been overtaken by
Daesh and its self-established “Caliphate” as the most desired destination.
(c) The third trend has been the activation and intensification of intra- and cross-
regional transnational jihadist “migration flows” frompredominantlyMuslim
countries and regions or those with significant and compact Muslim minor-
ities (often from areas of active local armed conflicts of varying intensity), as
well as from other regions (including individual and cells from fragmented
networks in the West, or, more broadly, the developed world, or the “global
North”). These flows are an upgrade from, and are no longer confined to, the
more traditional circulation of more or less professionalized militants from
one jihadist front to another. These flows are of themoremultiple and diverse
origin than even before and display a wide contextual variety of, borrowing
from the physics terminology, the process “from activation to migration”. At
the same time, however, these militant “migrations” are increasingly tar-
geted, pointed at, directed towards, and accumulated in three–five larger
“centers of gravity“ that correspond to the areas of the world!s most intense
and lethal regional armed conflicts that disproportionately account for the
lion!s share of both combat and terrorist activity in the world.
These three trends – (a) bottom-up regionalization, (b) network fragmentation
and (c) intensifying and more concentrated transnational “targeted migrations”
of jihadist militants – may be deeply rooted in different socio-political contexts
and driven, enabled and facilitated by different sets and levels of causes and
conditions.While inter-related, these trends are distinct, develop in parallel to one
another, and only partially overlap. However, it is precisely in the space where
they overlap – at the interface of all three – that we have got the Daesh phe-
nomenon as we know it.
41 Cf. Al-Suri Abu Mus-ab 2004, pp. 1367 f.
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